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The travails of PT Asuransi Jiwa Manulife (Manulife Indonesia), the
Indonesian life insurance subsidiary of Manulife Financial Corporation
(Manulife), are well known to Canadians. Manulife's problems over the past
two years within the Indonesian legal system most recently drew active
protests from the Canadian government after a solvent Manulife Indonesia
was (temporarily) placed in bankruptcy. Less well recognized is the fact that
the Manulife Indonesia case looks distinctly different to three different
groups: Canadian and other foreign investors generally versus the
governments involved versus the major Indonesian business community
(which is largely ethnic Chinese). We term the competing views
mythologies because they vary greatly (so how can they all be true?), while
each contains an element of truth but also hidden issues.
Like the proverbial three blind men describing an elephant, each
group seems in good faith to believe a mythology dictated by the group's
perspective. Foreign investors see in the Manulife Indonesia case a story
about judicial corruption and the generally weak status of the rule of law in
Indonesia. On the government side, even reform-minded elements in
Indonesia admit problems but perceived recent Canadian demands to
intervene directly in the judicial process as impinging on due process
concerns and Indonesian efforts to strengthen the rule of law. The major
Indonesian (Chinese) business community is unhappy with the current
situation, but is largely unsympathetic to Manulife because of perceived
carelessness in its business.
We shall try to unpack the Manulife Indonesia controversy in
looking (1) at a two year history of events as seen through foreign investor
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eyes, (2) then all the way back to Manulife Indonesia's 1985 founding to
uncover Indonesian private sector perspectives on the background of
Manulife's problematic former Indonesian partner and current antagonist, the
Dharmala group of companies controlled by the Gondokusumo family
(Dharmala), and (3) finally, at the government level, a four-year story
focused since the 1998 fall of the authoritarian *New Order government on
alleged corruption in the Indonesian judiciary, and whether foreign
government intervention as practiced in the Manulife Indonesia case may be
tempting but can be counterproductive. In parallel, one should recognize an
untold story concerning the apparent failure of international financial
institution involvement (here the International Finance Corporation or 1FC, a
World Bank affiliate owning a 9% equity interest in Manulife Indonesia
alongside Manulife's original 51% and Dharmala's original 40% equity
interests), to protect foreign private sector investment.
I. MANULIFE INDONESIA: THE FOREIGN INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE
The foreign investor version of the Manulife Indonesia saga follows.
Manulife Indonesia was the outgrowth of Manulife's business plan to expand
and redirect its international business to Asia for longer term growth reasons,
partnering Manulife's established insurance expertise with Dharmala as a
leading local business group. Manulife Indonesia quickly became one of the
dominant players in its relatively small national market, enjoying modest
immediate profits but substantial longer term prospects due to Indonesia's
then rapid growth and burgeoning population (now over 200,000,000
inhabitants). The aim was to grow the business organically within the
Indonesian economy, not to run a relatively short term project-based export
business (unlike many natural resource-based extractive businesses, since
Canadian mining companies have also been active investors in Indonesia).
At this point the story fast forwards to the 1999 aftermath of the
Asian Financial Crisis. Like many Indonesian business groups, Dharmala
was essentially insolvent while foreigners were looking for attractive
investments to participate in the anticipated revival of the Indonesian
economy. Unlike most other Indonesian debtors, its bank PT Dharmala Bank
was seized and effectively liquidated by banking authorities while its chief
non-bank finance affiliate Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera (DSS) was forced into
bankruptcy proceedings in 1999 (and delisted from the Jakarta Stock
Exchange on October 9, 2000). The value of DSS assets was the subject of
dispute as the bankruptcy receiver sought to maximize creditor recovery,
even while Dharmala sought to stave off liquidation in favor of a voluntary
debt composition promising pennies on the dollar in which it would
presumably retain control (because Indonesian bankruptcy law recognizes
only liquidation or a relatively weak voluntary debt composition approach,
Linnan 1999b). Manulife then made a business decision to buy DSS's 40%
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stake in Manulife Indonesia, whereupon the Manulife Indonesia saga really
begins in foreign investor eyes.
Manulife thought to purchase the 40% Dharmala stake in an auction
organized by DSS's curator or receiver in bankruptcy. The flavor of foreign
investor views is best conveyed in a 2001 analysis of Indonesian bankruptcy
law enforcement prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers, advisor to many
foreign investors at the time:
"Those debtors with knowledge of the law and the
system of law enforcement [in Indonesia] have an advantage
in manipulating outcomes to their advantage. Creditors'
claims of fraud and embezzlement are being overlooked by
authorities and the court. An interesting example is of the
Canadian life insurer, Manulife Financial Corporation, who
attempted to buy out the share of its Indonesian business
owned by its bankrupt local partner through an open auction
run by the court-appointed curator. Near the end of the
proceedings a lawyer claiming to represent the true owner of
the shares, a British Virgin Islands company called Roman
Gold, stepped forward. Since then the sale has been in limbo,
with the proceeds unusually being awarded to the custody of
the police. Manulife claims its partner had illegally sold its
40 percent stake in the venture, whereas the partner claims to
have sold its stake to a company called Harvest Hero
International Ltd in 1996. Roman Gold claims to have
purchased its stake from a Western Samoan registered
company called Highmead Ltd days before Manulife made
its own purchase from the curator. In an unusual twist,
Manulife's vice-president in Indonesia spent some time in
jail for his troubles, only being released supposedly on the
intervention by the Indonesian president acting on a plea
from the Canadian president (sic).
Co-incidentally, Highmead Ltd was a member of a
loan syndicate arranged by Harvest Hero, a Hong Kong,
China registered company that is meant to have lent
US$160m to PT Panca Overseas Finance in the second half
of 2000. [ed.-- Looking forward, Panca is an affiliate of the
Panin group, which itself allegedly comes from the same
Chinese ethno-linguistic group as Dharmala.] This
unsecured loan came in the midst of protracted negotiations
between Panca and its creditors, including several foreign
banks and the International Finance Corporation ("IFC") (a
member of the World Bank Group) who are owed around
2003-20041
S.C. Journal of Int'l Law & Business
US$68m. The IFC claims in its petition to the court that
Panca created these fictitious creditors in order to block
their petition to bankrupt the company and accept Panca's
restructuring proposal that offered all creditors, including the
recent ones, a payment of 17 cents in the dollar on their
debts. [ed.-- This approach would have negated the parallel
outcome in the DSS proceedings, where under Indonesian
bankruptcy law the creditors declined the debtor's
restructuring proposal and so forced the liquidation in
which DSS's interest in Manulife was sold.] The other
members of the syndicate are all registered in either Western
Samoa or the Bahamas. Harvest Hero, according to the IFC
submission, has paid up capital of HK$2, no telephone
listing in Hong Kong, China, nor any permit to lend money
there. Harvest Hero's registration papers lists the address of
one of its directors, the one who signed the loan agreement
with Panca, as a restaurant selling chicken and noodles in
North Jakarta. The restaurant's proprietor has never heard of
the director or Harvest Hero." (Pricewaterhouse 2001).
The combination of deadpan comedy and libel lawyer's advice is
palpable.
The subsequent history of the Manulife Indonesia controversy shifts
to a three-cornered litigation circus in Indonesia, Singapore and Hong Kong.
The details are less important than the apparent strategies in which Manulife
Indonesia was repeatedly attacked in Indonesian bankruptcy proceedings
(initially seeking to place the company in receivership based upon alleged
unpaid debts arising out of contested denials of death benefits under policies,
culminating most recently in the fictive dividend claim as an alleged unpaid
debt still owed to DSS). In turn, Manulife went on the offensive in Hong
Kong and Singapore courts in an attempt to disprove the claimed Roman
Gold-Harvest Hero transaction by demonstrating that they were controlled by
the Godokusumo family and represented an attempt to defraud creditors.
The litigation has been ugly by businessmen's standards, with Manulife
seeking to have its perceived tormentors jailed for fraud or their assets seized
while in an apparent scorched earth tactic Dharmala allegedly decided to
destroy Manulife Indonesia if its demands were not met. Its denouement has
come in two stages, first in a 2001 "settlement offer" in Singapore in which
an Indonesian allegedly with ties to the Godokusumo family offered that
legal harassment of Manulife Indonesia would cease upon payment of
US$40 million (the existence of which offer was subsequently denied, but
Manulife had videotaped the proceedings)(AFP 3/8/01). Then, Manulife
Indonesia was (temporarily) placed in bankruptcy, leading to it publicly
accusing the Indonesian bankruptcy court judges of taking bribes
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(Bloomberg 6/14/02). Then, the Canadian government made strong
representations to the Indonesian government concerning Manulife's
treatment, at which point the Indonesian Supreme Court in an accelerated
proceeding overturned the bankruptcy court ruling. It may be premature to
pronounce the Manulife Indonesia controversy to be finally resolved,
however, because the grounds on which the lower court decision was
overturned were procedural rather than substantive.
Looking forward, Manulife Indonesia's treatment is widely cited in
the international media as the leading example of how problems with the
Indonesian legal system impede much needed foreign investment. This
sentiment is paralleled widely within the Indonesian media in stories
anecdotally linking the Manulife Indonesia fiasco with recent period-to-
period comparisons of foreign direct investment into Indonesia showing a
reduction of up to 60%, while the Indonesian Ministry of Justice has taken
the unusual step of opening a corruption investigation against the judges
involved in the recent bankruptcy proceedings.
I1. MANULIFE INDONESIA: THE INDONESIAN
PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVE
Under local private sector views the real roots of Manulife Indonesia
problems reach back to the opening and deregulation of the Indonesian
financial sector in the early 1980s. At the time, Dharmala was reckoned as
the tenth largest Indonesian business group. Local financial sector expertise
was largely limited to a few banks at the time, and Dharmala was something
of a financial sector parvenue.' Dharmala's business had been founded in
1954 as an agricultural commodities trading operation in Surabaya dealing in
coffee, pepper, cassava, copra and corn first under the name NV Mansur,
then as PT Dharmala Inti Utama under the leadership of Soehargo
Gondokusumo (alias Go Ka Him), the Godokusumo family patriarch. The
patriarch's son Suyanto Gondokusumo studied in Singapore and the United
States, joining the family business in 1979 and soon rose to managing
director in charge of finance and international affairs.2 In 1980, Dharmala
established DMT International as a holding company based in Hong Kong
and Singapore to manage Dharmala businesses in diversifying outside
Indonesia, now a common practice for ethnic Chinese business empires (e.g.,
The Indonesian insurance industry has a history reaching back into Dutch colonial times (see Hollich
1961, 1-12), and Dharmala's relative lack of experience is striking compared to indigenous senior
management at its competitors drawing from established industry companies (see Silaban 1994, 21,41, 66,
113, 156, 177, 232-33, 257, 282). The Indonesian life insurance industry is commonly considered to have
really taken off only following a 1992 revision of laws governing the industry, but the industry was
already expanding rapidly in the late 1980s (see Wijaya 1991, 170). See also Binhadi 1995.
2 Portions of the material in this section are drawn from Putranto 2002 and portions from the author's
discussions in Jakarta of matters covered with persons associated with the Indonesian Chinese business
community.
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the Salim group's First Pacific empire based in Hong Kong) but at the time a
bold and controversial step because ethnic Chinese businessmen investing
outside Indonesia have always faced criticism locally for being "unpatriotic"
in sending capital abroad.
Thus, the Dharmala business was founded as a traditional trading
house by a local ethnic Chinese businessman, then the second generation was
groomed for business leadership in studying modem management abroad.
As Dharmala's crown prince Suyanto concentrated on financial services,
founding DSS, while Soehargo continued to manage Dharmala's agribusiness.
Thus, in 1985 Manulife Indonesia was born under the name PT Dharmala
Manulife Indonesia as a new insurance joint venture with ownership split
among Manulife (51 %), the IFC (9%) and Dharmala finance. affiliate DSS
(40%). In 1991, Suyanto succeeded Soehargo as Dharmala's chief executive
officer, in no small measure because of the meteoric rise of Dharmala's
financial sector businesses, including both Manulife Indonesia and Dharmala
Bank.
In Dharmala's 1996 heyday the group had more than 100 companies
including as business sectors real property, agribusiness, trading,
construction, industry and financial services, and holding approximately 6
trillion IDR in assets (almost US $2 billion at then current exchange rates)
with 20,000 employees. Dharmala was, however, among the more highly
leveraged Indonesian conglomerate families with both domestic rupiah
borrowings (often from the affiliated banks of other ethnic Chinese
conglomerates in Jakarta, with that unpaid debt remaining a sore subject in
the Chinese business community) and foreign currency borrowings abroad.
Dharmala immediately was counted as being in one of the weakest financial
positions when the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis struck, an unusual distinction
in a country plunged into a de facto depression in which practically all
businesses quickly stopped paying their debts. However, unlike most
Indonesian debtors who just stopped dealing with creditors by early 1998
without significant formal consequences (Linnan 1999b), many of
Dharmala's businesses within Indonesia have been the subject of formal
enforcement actions in varying fora such as delisting from the Jakarta Stock
Exchange (including DSS delisted 10/9/00, PT Dharmala Agrifood delisted
3/12/99, PT Aster Dharma Industri delisted 12/2/99 and PT Dharmindo
Adhiduta delisted 3/12/99), liquidation of an insolvent Dharmala Bank by
central banking authorities, and bankruptcy receivership such as the case of
DSS.
The natural question is why Dharmala has suffered such formal
enforcement setbacks even while other Chinese Indonesian and Pribumi
(Malay Indonesian) business conglomerates largely have not? The answer
offered privately within the Jakarta-based Chinese Indonesian business
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community is that, contrary to outside perceptions, there is more than one
"community" involved. The predominant Chinese Indonesian business
community in Indonesia is the Hokkien group from Fujian province speaking
various Min dialects.3 However, the Hokkien community itself breaks down
further into distinctive ethno-linguistic groups, with the Gondokusumo
family from Nanan in Quanzhou presumably speaking the Quanzhou variety
of Hokkien. Meanwhile, Quanzhou Hokkiens appear to have trouble getting
along with other Hokkien ethno-linguistic groups like Zhangzhou Hokkien
speakers, while some of the most successful Indonesian Chinese
businessmen are from yet another distinct Fujian ethno-linguistic group (e.g.,
Sudono Salim alias Liem Sioe Liong, a Hockchia from Fuqing). Dharmala is
criticized privately within the Chinese business community as being from a
"less moral" ethno-linguistic community which is claimed to be greedy in not
sharing the same reciprocal "business generosity" expected within the
majority Hokkien community (Dharmala being criticized for traditionally
keeping too much profit for itself as opposed to generous provision for other
- Chinese - business partners' reciprocal profits). In a chicken-and-egg
fashion, it is difficult to say whether Dharmala is considered an only
marginally acceptable business partner because it exists outside the majority
Hokkien informal enforcement community, or suffers from a labeling effect
because that same community automatically imputes poor business ethics to
non-members of the community.
Also difficult is the objective documentation of claims concerning
low business morality, with the majority Hokkien business community
referring rather to Dharmala's failure to balance Pribumi and Chinese
personnel in their operating businesses (keeping too tight family control with
deleterious effects on community reputation), the very fact that Dharmala
businesses have failed because Dharmala is not a full-fledged member of the
core Hokkien Indonesian Chinese business community, public relations
problems with Dharmala's early movement of capital offshore and perceived
closeness to the Hong Kong Chinese business community, "excessive"
affiliate transactions and inter-corporate guarantees, and the idea that even in
its heyday Dharmala business deals such as public offerings of partial
interests in its operating companies were not well received with the result
that Dharmala often (re)purchased parts of such offerings to hide poor
Compare Chinese dialect and Gondokusomo versus Salim family origin information at http://zz-
www.sd.cninfo.net/song/lawfaq/rich/yinnifei/c909036.htm, http://www.post 1.com/home/zhuangfu/
dialects.htm and http://weber.ucsd.edu/-dkjordan/chin/hbchilang-u.html. The details of ethno-linguistic
dialect subgroups and their character in pigeon-holing individuals is an anthropological exercise beyond
the scope of this essay, except to note that the Indonesian Chinese business community think that they
matter and that the dealings of the Gondokusomo family are apparently as a iesult affected within that
business community. The Western reader may find ethno-linguistic typecasting an odd exercise, but
within the Overseas Chinese world dialects are a subject of great interest and attributing social
characteristics to their speakers is no odder than, for example, ethnic jokes in the West, or individuals
affecting regional or standard accents in English-speaking countries in the alternative to play the fool or
sound posh following British usage.
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performance. This raises the broader question of how one documents non-
performance in an informal versus formal enforcement system, viewed as
reputational interests within a closed ethnic business community versus
public proceedings in the formal legal system such as in the Manulife-
Dharmala fight.
The above are all non-public aspects outside the law's formal
enforcement system, with the sole exception of one incident related to
problems with a marginal public offering. Within the financial community,
the example is cited that Dharmala once entered into a contract with
underwriters of an affiliate's public offering promising to repurchase any
shares not taken up in the offering. Such contracts were not uncommon at
the time, albeit impermissible under Indonesian capital market regulations to
the extent regulatory authorities insisted on firm underwritings. The offering
was not entirely successful and so the underwriters proceeded to repurchase
shares as part of offering stabilization activities. However, Dharmala refused
to honor its agreement to repurchase the shares, and the underwriters brought
suit to enforce the contract. This attempt at formal enforcement failed,
however, because the contract was adjudged void for public policy reasons
since it violated Indonesian capital markets regulations. The businessmen's
criticism inferring poor business ethics is not that Dharmala manipulated the
lawsuit (which it was probably entitled to as a purely doctrinal matter), but
that it did not keep its underlying promise. Thus, Manulife is not the first
Dharmala business partner to be disappointed in the formal enforcement
system.
Following Dharmala's financial setbacks, the Godokusumo family
moved to Singapore as have many Chinese Indonesian businessmen post-
Asian Financial Crisis. One reason was presumably to escape the reach of
Indonesian law.4 This reflects delicate Indonesian racial politics not clear to
most Canadians, that foreigners like Manulife may regard Singapore
positively as a jurisdiction with a functioning legal system, but in (Pribumi)
Indonesian eyes Singapore is a suspect haven for flight capital and corrupt
businessmen who triggered the nation's on-going crisis then fled the reach of
Indonesian law (so Manulife working through Hong Kong and Singapore
courts raises Indonesian hackles). The other reason was to access Dharmala's
overseas assets and business ventures. Unlike more affluent Chinese
Indonesian business families (e.g., the Salim family's First Pacific
investments via Hong Kong or even Eka Wijaya with the Sinar Mas group's
Chinese investments now bedeviling Asia Pulp & Paper creditors), however,
See Bloomberg 4/25/01, because political pressure has grown for punitive actions, including potential
arrest and prison terms, as ordinary Indonesians have felt increasingly impoverished since 1997 as a result
of the misbehavior of major business groups. The parallel is clear to the public outcry in the US following
recently revealed accounting malfeasance and a plunging stock market, with the US Congress responding
to constituent pressure in passing sweeping legislation.
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Dharmala's equity overseas is privately estimated to be in the range of only
US $35-$50 million. The story in the Jakarta Chinese business community is
that Dharmala is effectively finished in Indonesia, and is trying to extract
funds from Manulife in reality only to use outside Indonesia because current
Dharmala resources are otherwise insufficient to rebuild its businesses
outside Indonesia. Looking to Indonesia's major Chinese business
community, in private they criticize the Dharmala's recent actions against
Manulife Indonesia as drawing unwanted attention and hardly worth the grief
for the amounts involved. However, they find them unsurprising because
Dharmala has enjoyed a mixed reputation for business ethics within its own
community long predating current Manulife Indonesia problems.
The above is a more nuanced businessmen's version of how and why
Dharmala was viewed locally in Jakarta as a difficult partner long before the
current Manulife Indonesia controversy. The implicit question then is why
Manulife did not know, or in the alternative disregarded, all the warning
signs in a 15+ year business relationship? There are at least three
possibilities. The first is a failure of due diligence on the business level, or
more charitably that the issues did not present themselves squarely in 1985
when the original Manulife Indonesia partnership was created (and later the
die was already cast). The second is that Manulife knowingly incurred the
business risk in 1985 of a difficult business partner, perhaps believing in
formal enforcement system terms that management control via its 51%
ownership interest in Manulife Indonesia was comfort enough (since it is
striking in a business sense that Manulife in 1985 did not seek out a local
partner with greater financial sector expertise, presumably because such a
partner would have demanded control or at least a larger share in business
benefits). The third is that Manulife itself relied on the foreign investor
version of an informal enforcement system for developing country
investments, namely retorsion at the government to government level.
Structurally, this was potentially possible either via the direct involvement of
international financial institutions in the form of the IFC's 9% interest (a kind
of moral guarantee given that problems caused by Dharmala would
automatically affect both Manulife and the IFC, which has recourse through
the World Bank directly to the Indonesian government), or bilaterally in
pushing the Canadian officials to pursue its complaints with their Indonesian
counterparts.
The first and second possibilities would be Manulife's risk in a
business sense, to which the proper response at a government policy level is
presumably to offer Manulife reasonable support in its current predicament
but ultimately leaving it to its own devices assuming it accepted the risk.
Thus, the Indonesian private sector is largely unsympathetic to Manulife
Indonesia's plight, not because of any closeness to Dharmala but rather
because they criticize Manulife's business judgment (visible only beyond the
2003 -2004]
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two year time horizon in terms of which foreign investors see the on-going
controversy). The third possibility raises the broader institutional question
whether the international community realistically can push simultaneously
for development of formal enforcement systems via the rule of law and
retention of its own informal enforcement system (retorsion) if and when the
formal enforcement system fails. This third possibility is more a judgment
issue for governments than the private sector, to which issue we now turn.
III. MANULIFE INDONESIA: THE GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE
Enforceable contracts are the lifeblood of modem business activity;
meanwhile, charges of judicial corruption in Indonesian bankruptcy
proceedings are nothing new (Linnan 1999b, 121-22). At a certain level the
Manulife Indonesia story is about development of formal versus informal
enforcement systems for economic activity in developing countries. For
these purposes the legal system and its courts are the formal enforcement
system, while an informal enforcement system should be understood as any
system in which the parties, in reliance upon reputational interests or the non-
obligatory grant/withholding of a benefit or infliction of a detriment, directly
or indirectly attempt to force a private party to respect its contractual
obligations. The traditional example of an informal enforcement system is a
community of merchants who may deal, or refuse to deal, with each other or
third parties based on reputation (compare North 1990). Such communities,
typically linked by distinct ethnic or geographic ties, include the Jakarta-
based ethnic Chinese business community consisting of the major
conglomerates/corporate groups under family control.
In developing country eyes, however, the concept of an informal
enforcement system for private relations also extends to economic coercion
organized against a country's government whether via intensive government-
to-government lobbying by the investor's home government as the modern
form of diplomatic protection, or through international financial institutions.
This is retorsion in public international law terms, when the capital importing
country's government faces the implicit or explicit threat by the capital
exporting country's government that, failing satisfactory resolution of the
foreign investor's "private" difficulties, voluntarily made bilateral foreign
aid/multilateral program loans will be withheld.
It seems unlikely that in 1985 Manulife entertained any illusions
about the status of the rule of law in Indonesia when it originally entered
upon the Manulife Indonesia partnership with Dharmala. Presumably,
Manulife chose its local partner with a view to its ability to navigate a society
in which the rule of law was weak. In this light Manulife still deserves
support with its current problems, but the situation is less clear than it
appears even while Manulife seems genuinely surprised at its former
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partner's current behavior. It raises questions about the broader problem for
long-standing foreign investors, who now seek protection in formal
enforcement through embracing the rule of law. However, they often entered
Indonesia through joint ventures like Manulife's at a time when they were
relying more likely on the informal hierarchy of an authoritarian government
for protection (so ultimate recourse when problems occurred was to complain
to the responsible Indonesian minister and ultimately the president, possibly
via their home governments as in the Manulife Indonesia case). The
difference from current practice is that, at the time, the international
community had not yet begun its latest heavy push to improve governance in
Indonesia, including the rule of law, and so this "informal enforcement"
approach seemed unremarkable in local eyes.5
To that extent, the Manulife Indonesia problem is about transitions
and how to navigate a change from an informal enforcement system to a
formal one. Reaching back to the informal system's heyday, one of the
oddest aspects of foreign investor behavior in Indonesia always has been its
inconsistency in foreign investors' embrace of well-connected partners under
the New Order government. Such partners were largely chosen for their
ability to game the system in maneuvering through the local business and
government communities, but then the same foreign investors evinced
surprise that said local partners might also game their foreign partners too
when it suited them. No reasonable business person, even in a country
enjoying the full benefits of the rule of law, chooses their partners without
close attention to their business ethics (e.g., is their word their bond in
traditional terms, or giving close attention to reputational interests within the
business community in economic parlance). Only lawyers like litigation,
while business people regard recourse even to a functioning formal
enforcement system as a painful exercise in damage control. Thus the
Manulife Indonesia controversy may be negative for foreign investment
sentiment, but at the same time implicit claims are overstated that foreign
investors rely primarily on the local legal system for protection.
At the policy level of government, the problem is twofold concerning
what to do when faced with issues like Manulife Indonesia. Simple
references to Indonesian problems such as judicial corruption generally do
not resolve the issues, nor do private sector claims that if specified things do
not take place, foreign investment will dry up. Private sector investment will
continue as long as there are profits to be made, with the caveat that greater
risks must be offset by greater rewards (i.e., they require higher potential
5 In fact, depending upon one reckons organized legal reform efforts in terms of generations, the
developing world is probably in its fourth or fifth generation while Indonesia is at least in its third. See
Linnan 1999. While some foreign investors might have entered Indonesia long enough ago in the late
1960s-early 1970s to claim reliance on past institutional reform efforts, they would be a very small
minority.
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profits thus reducing the number of economically feasible investment
projects and ultimately lower local economic performance). Thus, a
developing country like Indonesia should perceive it as in its own interests to
embrace improved governance and the rule of law. The broader problem is
what to do about a situation like the Manulife Indonesia problem during what
all parties hope is a longer term transition in Indonesia to an effective legal
system.
On the one hand, formal enforcement systems and the rule of law do
not spring into being full-grown, and so the question presents itself whether
and when old-fashioned diplomatic protection or generically retorsion is
permissible to exercise influence at a government level to settle a dispute at
the private party level. This is not an abstract possibility, since it arguably
already presents itself in the Manulife Indonesia if one assumes that
Indonesian government and society are making a bona fide effort to make the
transition longer term to a law and market-based system (for the benefit of
Indonesians primarily, although foreign investors would benefit
coincidentally).
On the other hand, from an Indonesian point of view, asking its
executive branch to intervene in an individual judicial branch proceeding is
at least superficially inconsistent with the resounding parallel message from
the international community asking Indonesia to improve governance
including judicial independence (including dealing with corruption, including
judicial corruption, via general civil service reform and approaches such as
an anti-corruption commission). The political risk is that, given Indonesians'
nationalistic predisposition to be suspicious of foreign motives, implicitly or
explicitly threatening retorsion plays into the hands of those who argue
within Indonesia in the alternative that the international financial institutions
themselves are just tools of developed countries (a charge made more often
against American than Canadian government policy), or that foreigners
basically just want their investors to win and so the international
community's insistence on reforming governance is not sincere (Indonesian
politics' version of a foreign conspiracy theory).
The risk is that, in pushing for direct government intervention into
the operations of the (still weak) Indonesian legal system, the harder you
push on intervention the higher the risk of undercutting development of the
legal system itself. The counterargument is that the foreign push for
intervention results from judicial corruption issues. However, judging by
senior Indonesian political figures' public statements (Mahendra 2002,
Tempo Interaktif 2002), that presents a problem in both prejudging the
judiciary before investigation and undercutting due process concerns.
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Adding to the problem at the economic level of foreign policy is now
an additional tension related to general "war on terrorism" concerns. Foreign
investor problems appear to foreigners to have only commercial
consequences. However, particularly within Indonesia as a majority
Moslem country and battleground in a broader fight for public opinion (e.g.,
is the West now waging a war on terrorism or a war on Islam?), claims of
foreign conspiracies or insincerity may fall on fertile ground among
segments of the Indonesian population. At the (Canadian) government
policy level, the Manulife Indonesia controversy presumably requires a
balancing of economic and non-economic foreign policy concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the Jakarta-based foreign business community is lined up
solidly behind Manulife, the local Chinese business community is largely
unsympathetic to its plight. In a nutshell, they believe that if they, the
Chinese business community, largely treat Dharmala as an outsider and are
reluctant to deal with it, the foreigners deserve what they get when they do.
However, major players in that selfsame Chinese business community have
themselves largely stalled any formal enforcement attempts at involuntary
reorganization of their corporate groups through the Indonesian bankruptcy
courts post-Asian financial crisis (Linnan 1999b). To that extent, the chief
difference between Dharmala and the balance of the local business
community at the level of formal enforcement is Dharmala's attempted use of
bankruptcy law as a sword while the others have employed it more as a
shield.
What goes often unrecognized in the Manulife Indonesia controversy
is that the Dharmala Group is unusual by Indonesian standards chiefly in
having lost several member companies to legal proceedings, including the
bankruptcy proceeding in which Manulife purchased DSS's interest in
Manulife Indonesia. The formal enforcement system seems to have worked
more often than not with Dharmala, but the reason given privately in Jakarta
is precisely because Dharmala is only a limited member of the major Chinese
business community and so has been excluded from its mutual support
networks. On the other hand, from an Indonesian perspective, Manulife's
apparent recourse to diplomatic protection via the Canadian government and
parallel pressure on the Indonesian government via international financial
institutions (IFC/World Bank) is itself viewed as an election for a competing
informal enforcement system basically inconsistent with those same
institutions' advocacy of improving the formal enforcement system (i.e.,
pushing development of the rule of law).
Hence competing mythologies, that foreign investors view the
Manulife Indonesia controversy as an indictment of the Indonesian legal
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system, while Indonesian government reformers admit problems but see
Canadian insistence on intervention in the legal proceedings as undercutting
a "bright light" in the form of the perceived relatively successful performance
of the formal enforcement system in dealing with Dharmala. Meanwhile, the
Indonesian Chinese business community's mythology is not ultimately
aligned with Dharmala's interests but maintains that Manulife is just whining
about problems inflicted by its own misguided business decisions. At the
same time, one of the hidden questions in the Manulife Indonesia
controversy is whether Manulife mistakenly relied on the "moral" guarantee
implicit in investing together with the [FC. To a certain extent, Manulife's
longer term behavior makes sense only if it embraced the idea that the
Indonesian government ultimately would control Dharmala as Manulife
Indonesia's Indonesian partner (to avoid problems for the Indonesia
government in its broader relationship with the World Bank).
Whose version of the truth is most compelling?
Manulife Indonesia
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